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In March 1617 Marius Muta, a Judge of the Supreme Court of
Sicily, sentenced a certain Leonardus to seven years in the
galleys. It seems that Leonardus had lured his unfaithful wife
outside the city walls, where he killed her, and where her body
was later partially eaten by dogs. He had enticed her to the place
of the murder by using his son, or her son, or their son (the Latin
text says only 'per filium '), and the weight of the sentence bore
less on the murder itself than on the mode of the killing:
A report of the case therefore having been made in the General
Visitation in March 1617, before his Excellency, because there
appeared the wicked method of killing her, she having been
thus called by his son and afterwards her corpse was discovered
just as though the dogs had devoured it outside the walls,
Leonardus himself was sentenced to the royal galleys for seven
years.2
Over eighty years later, this case was cited twice by Desiderius
Spreti in his defence of Guido Franceschini, a Tuscan nobleman
on trial in Rome for the murder of his wife.3 The defence
argument was intended, not to secure acquittal, but to avoid the
capital penalty, and the basis of this argument was that Guido's
honour had been injured by the infidelity of his wife. The
analogy with Leonardus, as presented in Muta's judgment, is
clear, as is the usefulness of the case to the defending lawyer.
But the argument of the defence was not accepted by the court,
and Guido was beheaded on 22 February 1698.
More than two and a half centuries later the case found its way
into English literature in Robert Browning's The Ring and the
Book (1868-9),4 a poem based on the Franceschini trial as
recorded in contemporary legal documents discovered by the
poet. Browning's defence lawyer, Dominus Hyacinthus de
Archangelis (in the actual case Spreti had been his junior), cites
the case of Leonardus:
For pregnant instance, let us contemplate
The luck of Leonardus, - see at large
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Of Sicily's Decisions sixty-trrst.
This Leonard finds his wife is false: what then?
He makes her own son snare her, and entice
Out of the town-walls to a private walk:,
Wherein he slays her with commodity.
They tmd her body half-devomed by dogs:
Leonard is tried, convicted, punished, sent
To labour in the galleys seven years long:
Why? For the murder? Nay, but for the mode! (VID. 809-19)
Just as Spreti gave Muta's judgment new life by citing it in the
context of a new case, so Browning's version brings the case to
life again, and gives it new discursive and linguistic vitality by
translating it, not just from Latin into English (for Browning did
not have the benefit of Gest's translation), but also from legal
discourse into poetry. The poem pushes the citation in the general
direction of narrative fiction, and in so doing it brings law
and literature into mutually illuminating relationship. The two
citations, in the Franceschini trial and in Browning's poem, tell
the same story in different ways, and to look at them in relation
to each other is to observe law and literature grappling and
communicating with each other.
In the two versions, the same story is given different kinds of
coherence. Both versions begin with the decision, but whereas
Spreti moves from the decision through the reasons behind it to
the actions informing it, Browning's Archangeli goes from the
decision, to the actions, to the sentence, and concludes with the
reason for the decision. In Spreti's account, the actions which
prompted the case are processed in a discourse which privileges
decision, reasoning, and sentence over 'what happened'. His
narrative subordinates the story in the trial to the story of the
trial,5 whereas the literary lawyer makes the trial part of the
story. Archangeli foregrounds·the story in the trial by avoiding
the institutional passive and by using the present tense, as well as
by changing the narrative sequence into something like a
chronology of events. And of course Archangeli's extra-legal
play with language ('pregnant') leers at a pre-legal story. The
coherences of Spreti's account, on the other hand, are not those
of chronological sequence. His story is shaped by the way the
judgment constructs the circumstances of the case, and in a
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tangible manifestation of what James Boyd White has called 'the
invisible discourse of the law',6 a language of judgment writes
out a language of description. The lawyer's alliterative phrase the
'luck of Leonardus' serves as a further poetic comment on the
nature of legal judgment by making it seem quite arbitrary.
This careful rewriting of the precedent in the poem draws out
the descriptive structures which the judgmental language of the
law suppresses, but on which it depends. Stanley Fish has
pointed out that precedent is itself a means to authority and
coherence, 'the process by which the past gets produced by the
present so that it can then be cited as the producer of the
present'.7 Legal citation, that is to say, not only takes a narrative
form; it also locates its primary case within larger configurations
of social meaning to which it does not explicitly refer. Browning
thus confidently translates 'per filium' as 'her son', which Gest
seems to have thought incorrect. But this turning against his wife
of her own son both intensifies the betrayal on which the
judgment turns and which the lawyer wishes to emphasize, and
also heightens the sense of a patriarchal plot against all women
which the poem as a whole emphasizes. Such a plot works in
social terms through legal structures - in this instance those of
the Patria Potestas as represented by the corpus juris - and legal
rhetoric, and the method of the poem is to tum the law against
itself.
This comparison of the handling of Leonardus by Muta, via
the Spreti of the Old Yellow Book, and by the Archangeli of The
Ring and the Book, suggests some ways in which literature can
engage creatively with law. Browning's engagement here is of
course critical, but his poem's close dependence on its source
meant that he could not simply be dismissive, and that his poem
had to take legal discourse and its authority seriously. This
results in an intricate and dense interweaving of law and literature
that is as searching, and as culturally significant as the great
'legal' works of Browning's contemporaries Dickens, Melville,
and Dostoevsky. In The Ring and the Book literature comments
on the law, not by treating legal themes or figures to exemplify
aspects of legal formalism, but by translating law into literature.
This translation involves analysis of the metorical structures of
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legal story-telling, by bringing law and literature together in such
a way that their languages comment on each other.
To analyse such interdisciplinary commentary is to seek out
points at which law and literature meet. In 1982 the Texas Law
Review held a symposium on 'Law and Literature'; in 1989 the
Michigan Law Review held a symposium on legal storytelling;
and 1988-89 also saw the establishment of two interdisciplinary
journals, the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, and
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature.8 All of these suggest and
explore significant points of contact between literary and legal
studies, and what follows here will attempt to explain such inter-
disciplinary explorations, particularly in the movement that has
become known as 'Law and Literature.' Law and literature meet
in rhetoric: that is their common feature; for the origins of both
law and literature as they have developed in the west are to be
found in the theory and practice of Ibetoric as developed in Greek
philosophy, and in the Roman schools of declamation. Such
theory and practice are closely related in the literature and law of
Greece and Rome.9 A legal judgment, a statute, a deposition,
deploys its language as carefully, as strategically, and as
designedly as does a poem, a play, or a novel; its organisation
is a matter of rhetoric. To stress rhetoric as the meeting-point,
or common ground, of law and literature is itself a rhetorical
move which involves overlooking or disregarding the clearest
line of demarcation between law and literature, which is that
the law involves the exercise of power in ways that literature
does not. In so far as books ever change lives, they do so in
ways that differ radically from imperative acts of adjudication)O
The disregarding of that key difference is itself a legal trope, a
procedural fiction to which Law and Literature practitioners
knowingly commit themselves in order to explore the common
linguistic and metorical principles that may enable the disciplines
to illuminate each other. (The Yale Journal of Law and the
Humanities implicitly acknowledges the significance of this
difference by holding a symposium, in its most recent issue, on
'Language, Law, and Compulsion'.)l1 This focus on rhetoric,
whatever its limitations, does help to suggest why and how the
methods of both disciplines have come under similar kinds of
scrutiny and questioning from the same quarter. Legal scholars,
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like their literary counterparts, have grown conscious, not just
of the language of the canonical texts of their discipline, but
also of the rhetoric in which they have traditionally discussed
those texts, and the rise of Critical Legal Studies is the most
tangible evidence of the effect, on the law, of structuralism and
deconstruction.l2 Derrida has made his presence felt in both
literary and legal studies, and the powerful rhetoric of Michel
Foucault, whose notion of discourse as power has been
enonnously influential in literary studies, has challenged, and
changed, many established modes of thought in the legal
academy.13
But not everything that happens in the general configuration
of Law and Literature can be put down to structuralism or de-
construction, and enough is happening, of sufficient intellectual
diversity, to require some distinctions. The distinctions that I
am about to make are necessarily idiosyncratic, and they do not
harmonise with those made by two distinguished American legal
scholars.l4 This may be because it is necessary first to dis-
criminate between developments in Britain, and in the United
States. The Law and Literature movement is a distinctively
American phenomenon, having little to do with the British
scholarship that concentrates on the literary nature of legal
activity. In Britain, Bernard Jackson and Peter Goodrich have
both emphasised law as a text-based activity that is profoundly
concerned with reading and writing,15 and although they stress
literary features of legal discourse (such as narrative), they
draw more heavily on the techniques of fonnallinguistics than
do most American scholars in the Law and Literature field. In
spite of their radical disagreements, which lie beyond the scope
of this paper, Goodrich and Jackson are mainly concerned with
the positivist tradition in English jurisprudence. Differentiating
features in the legal cultures on different sides of the Atlantic may
have conditioned quite distinct approaches to the literary features
of the law.
In the United States, literary and legal scholars have been
united for some years in the henneneutical strife which has
divided them. The interpretation of literary texts, and the
interpretation of legal texts, have raised similar theoretical issues,
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such as intentionalism, and the possibility of objectivity in
intetpretation as against the inevitability of subjectivity. In literary
criticism, Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'The Intentional Fallacy'
effectively did away with authorial intention for a generation
(though there were dissenting voices, most notably that of E. D.
Hirsch); Barthes's 'The Death of the Author' was a belated coup
de gttce.l6 Presumably ~cause of the power with which legal
texts are invested, the question of the intentions of those who
frame statutes (notably the Constitution) and who make judicial
decisions which then become precedents has remained
contentious, particularly in the United States.l7 The ongoing
hermeneutical debate about objectivity and subjectivity was
revitalized by the Texas Law Review symposium on Law and
Literature in 1982. This issue contained a paper by Ronald
Dwooon, 'Law as Intetpretation,' which put forward an analogy
between a judge making a decision and the writer of a chapter in
a chain-novel, with previous decisions (like previous chapters)
for his guide, but with some space to make his own contribution.
This paper was also published, also in 1982, in a special issue of
the literary theoretical journal Critical Inquiry. 18 Bothjournals
also contained Stanley Fish's reply to Dworldn, 'Worldng on the
Chain Gang: Intetpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism'.
(The same debate, between a professor of Law and a professor
of both Law and English, is being carried on simultaneously in a
literary and a legal journal.) When the Critical Inquiry collection
was reprinted as a book, in 1983,19 Dworkin replied to Fish
(and others) with 'Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any
More,' to which Fish responded, in the Texas Law Review for
same year, with the brusquely titled 'Wrong Again.' (At this
point the literary and legal journals are talking to each other.)
Dworldn struck back three years later in Law's Empire, only to
provoke a provocative reply from an unregenerate Fish: 'Still
Wrong After All These Years,' was published in a special issue
of Law and Philosophy devoted to responses to Dworkin's
book.20 (Now the debate has moved firmly into the legal
domain.) The case remains undecided, with further submissions
presumably to be heard, but the last word currently belongs to
Fish. The Dworkin-Fish exchange has become central to
discussions of literary and legal intetpretation, and the writings
of Fish have become the controversial focus of the discussion of
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the similarities and differences between interpretation in literature
and in law.21 Most of the work, as the drift of the bibliographical
details cited above suggests, is being done by legal scholars.
Beyond all this, there is law-as-literature, or literary juris-
prudence, which stresses the common systems of language
shared by law and literature. This is the centre of the Law and
Literature movement, the place where legal specialists might be
most distrustful of it (because it opens their territory to
outsiders), and the place where litterateurs find it most accessible
(for the same reason). James Boyd White, who professes Law,
English, and Classical Studies is a leading figure here. White
brings the law dramatically to life by reading legal texts as though
they were literary texts, and by talking about them in a
vocabulary that he brings from the humanities. White's books
range over English and American literature, Greek literature, and
history, as well as law; and in all his writings White is concerned
to bring literary texts into relationship with legal texts, generally
from constitutional and criminallaw.22 White insists that the
heart of a lawyer's life is literary in that it is to do with telling
stories, and he reads the law as a system of narrative and
dramatic poetics. His central, bold claim is that the law, as a
system of verbal action, should be seen among the humanities.
This is because the language of the law should be (in White's
terms) literary rather than theoretical; for at the centre of legal
activity is a concern with the meaning of events z,nd the quality of
relations which requires a tentative and poetic language for its
operations. The legal process as White sees it is thus a constant
process of translation from ordinary language to legal language
and back again, and cultural relationships and meanings emerge
from that process. White makes a massively humanist claim
for law as a social as well as a rhetorical activity, a culture
of argument that is also a positive force. It is through the law,
he argues, that we constitute our culture and define our social
relations, and in these terms the law is an ongoing conversation
through which we create a metorical community over time.
This is obviously far removed from what goes on in the local
courts from day to day, and White has been criticised as other-
worldly; but, working firmly within a liberal humanist tradition,
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he is addressing himself to legal discourse in its ideal fonn. Law
and Literature has grown from the ethos of liberal humanism,
and whatever the implications of the Law and Literature
movement for the academic study oflaw, its politics are pluralist
and conservative, and clearly distanced from those of the more
radical Critical Legal Studies Movement with which it is
sometimes lumped. White's literary approach to the law is best
exemplified in his first book, The Legal Imagination, a text book
for law students. His analysis of the rhetorical function of
conversation in Emma, in When Words Lose Their Meaning, is a
good demonstration of how his method can refresh our reading
of familiar literary texts. White is a much better reader of
literature than Richard Posner, whose Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relation (see n.17 above) is shackled by its
outmoded New Critical methodology. Posner, who is both a
judge and a legal academic, has little time for the Law and
Literature movement as represented by White, and he champions
instead Law and Economics. That is a movement to which White
is strongly opposed, because it tries to appropriate law to the
social sciences rather than to the humanities which is where, for
White, it truly belongs. The language of economics reduces
human transactions to the model of exchange, and it is precisely
from such models that the literary language of the law has the
power to liberate us.23
It is odd that the only book 'about' the Law and Literature
movement, that by Posner, should have been written by one of
its enemies. This book was lauded by the economic. right, and
savaged by the lefi,24 and a substantial if somewhat critical
review essay by Richard Weisberg may provide the best guide to
the politics of the Law and Literature movement.25 Weisberg
takes Posner to task on (particularly) Billy Budd and The
Merchant of Venice, but also on the deductive logic of his
impersonal jurisprudence which, in Weisberg's view, detennines
Posner's inadequate reading of literary texts. Weisberg argues
against Posner for a humanistically-oriented application of the
rule of law based on an inductive, case-specific tradition. He
claims that literary art about law is itself a rich source of
jurisprudential values, and that literary stories about the law
force us to grapple with the unique elements that come to the fore
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when the law acts on people. Weisberg's claim, based as it is on
an appeal to a central humanism, leads logically to the following
questions: 'Can vitalistic values -love of environment, sexual
and artistic expression, individual eccentricity, personal privacy
meshed with public responsibility - survive a predominantly
verbal and often repressed and anti-vitalistic legal power
structure? Can the perspective of children, so wonderfully
conveyed by great fiction, be appreciated by modem legal
institutions? Or the plight of the poor and homeless?'26 These
rhetorical questions, however important they may be, define
the politics of the literary jurisprudence as liberal rather than
radical, as strictly non-subversive of legal institutions. They are
themselves no more than a form of special pleading, a plea for
compassion, sympathy, pluralism, and for the humanism of
'great fiction,' rather than a demand that social or legal structures
be changed. This point is worth making because Weisberg is,
like White, a central figure in the Law and Literature movement.
In fairness to him, it must be said that the his own literary
analysis, in this review and in his book The Failure of the
Word 27 probes the discursive authority of the law with radically
disturbing perceptivess to which his own theory does less than
justice. His searching discussion of legal ways of talking in
Dostoevsky, Flaubert, Camus and Melville goes well beyond the
politically liberal terms ofhis theoretical frameworlc.
The liberal-humanist terms of Weisberg's frameworlc, and of
White's vocabulary, suggest that the Law and Literature move-
ment may have grown from the 'crisis in the humanities,' that it
may be an attempt by a core discipline in the humanities to
appropriate, in a pragmatic world, the authority and probity of a
professional discipline. The evidence suggests otherwise. The
impetus behind the movement has come almost entirely from law
schools in the United States, and some reasons for the law's
interest in the literary features of its discursive practices can be
tentatively suggested. One such reason may be that, during the
last twenty or so years, the legal profession (at least in the United
States), has opened its doors to those who were formerly
outsiders, and that the increased human diversity of the legal
profession is reflected in a diversity of legal scholarship. The
special issue of the Michigan Law Review on legal storytelling
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(in which all papers were by legal scholars) took shape as an
exploration of the 'counterhegemonic' power of various kinds of
legal narrative, as if in acknowledgement that the stories of which
the law is 'made up' (in both senses) are changing.28 Peter
Brooks, an authority on narrative, has suggested that narrative is
a juncture between law and the humanities to which we can
usefully attend, because narrative makes us feel that we are
dealing with actual experience in a way that the normative
syllogism (the basic unit onegal rhetoric) does not29 It follows
from this that the analysis ofnarrative strategies in law may help
non-specialists not only to understand, but also to challenge, a
discourse of immense material power. Bernard Jackson gives a
further tum of the screw to this argument by suggesting that legal
discourse is sustained by narrative structures, and that the
enthymeme or syllogism as used in legal reasoning draws on
narrative frameworlcs which have a social origin .30
Ivor Indyk has demonstrated that the politicization of the
humanities was a direct consequence of events in Europe in
1968.31 In English studies, the influence of continental
philosophy challenged the New Critical orthodoxy that had
prevailed since the 1940s, and inspired a greater social
contextualization of the discipline. The Critical Legal Studies
movement may have similar origins; and although I have taken
pains to distinguish Law and Literature from Critical Legal
Studies, the origins of Law and Literature may also be traceable
to 1968 - the year in which Martin Luther King and Robert F.
Kennedy were assassinated, the year Eugene McCarthy made the
running for the Democratic nomination, the year of the Chicago
seven, and the year in which Richard M. Nixon won the
presidential election. The date of James Boyd White's The Legal
Imagination may be significant here: 1973, the year of
Watergate, between the Nixon landslide of 1972 and the end of
the Nixon presidency in 1974. For those entering law schools in
the United States at the end of the sixties or the beginning of the
seventies, whose political sympathies had been with Eugene
McCarthy or Robert Kennedy but who turned from a political
party which could stage the Democratic Convention in Chicago in
1968, and who were appalled by the illegal acts of the President
and his administration in what was then Cambodia as well as in
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Washington, White's book could have been important. It was a
text-book that suggested a reconstitution oflegal scholarship, that
demonstrated that law could be talked about in ways very
different from the orthodox ways then prevalent in law schools,
and that stimulated the legal academy to some diversity in the
ways it thought and talked about itself. It could have made a
difference by suggesting that lawyers could make a difference.
So argues Milner S. Ball, Professor of Constitutional Law at
Georgia, and himself a transgressor of the boundaries between
law and other disciplines.32 His 'confession' effectively, and in
my view correctly, grounds Law and Literature in the politics of
American liberalism, and the origination of the movement in the
United States may be explained by the significant configuration
of law and letters in American culture.33 The foundational texts
of the American republic, the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution, are central documents of more than legal
significance in the cultural life of their nation. The Gettysburg
address was delivered by a backwoods lawyer who was himself
a significant interpreter of democratic theory in America, whose
sayings are part of American lore, and who was the subject of the
most overtly political poetic venture in American literature, Walt
Whitman's 'Memories of President Lincoln.' The journal edited
by Richard Weisberg takes its name from Benjamin Cardozo,
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1932-1938),
whose judgments are explicitly committed to 'living law', and
who himself wrote lucidly on 'Law and Literature'.34 When Don
Anderson exhorts us, in our consideration of law and literature,
to think always of Dickens,35 he is himself thinking within an
Anglo-European tradition that is in many ways alien to America;
for an American would think first and foremost of Herman
Melville, creator of Captain Vere as well as Captain Ahab. Billy
Budd, Sailor is a canonical text in both American literature and
American legal scholarship, having received almost as much
comment from lawyers as from literary critics. Thus, Cardozo
Studies in Law and Literature initiated itself with a symposium
on this 'favorite text in law and literature scholarship'. 36
The intellectual activities that fall under the general heading of
'Law and Literature' are becoming too diverse to classify. It is to
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be hoped that the journals do not allow themselves to get too
involved in the theory of their fledgling enterprise, and that they
grow into multidisciplinary meeting-places. Literary and legal
texts should be brought into relationship through discourse
analysis of various kinds. The established literary focus on legal
discourse should broaden from constitutional and criminal law to
include property, torts, and contract, possibly adding a 'culture
of agreement' to James Boyd White's 'culture of argument' And
lawyers should not appropriate literature by asking questions like
'Can Shakespeare Make You a Partner? '37 which relegate the
study of literature to no more than a remedial activity in the
serious business of the pursuit of power. Robert Ferguson's
literary analysis of the generic features of the judicial opinion as
having its own unacknowledged conventions, based on a Ihetoric
of inevitability, might be extended to other features of legal
discourse; and literary debate about what canons are and how
they are constituted may now be influencing consideration
of 'canonical' legal texts.38 Above all, there is fiction: is there
any connection between the novelist's fictional contract with the
reader, and the procedural pretences of the law?39 The conscious
pretence of a game of art is one thing; the use of such pretences
in the most established discourse of social power may be quite
another. Historians should join the fray, for they too live by their
fictions, and historical narrative, like its legal counterpart,
produces only a series of variant readings and interpretations.40
To analyse the poetry of Wallace Stevens, or of Roy Fuller, in
full knowledge that it is the writing of a practising lawyer, may
illuminate both poetry as a forensic art, and some potentially
creative features of legal discourse. To place one discipline at the
service of another presents no great challenge, but to bring law
and literature together in ways that use the methodologies of both
disciplines to comment on each other is challenging indeed. The
difficulty of this should not be underestimated, because the law
as recorded in practice, in actual cases, is always culturally and
historically specific - as is literature, and as is the practice of
criticism. The much-praised plot of Great Expectations, which
works through a series of legal arrangements, might be brought
into relationship with the book's central characters in such a way
as to help us better understand the concepts of character and
individualism as they were constituted by the social organisation
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of Victorian England. To put literary and legal disciplines in such
relationship is challenging in a scholarly as well as in a critical
sense because it requires not only a great deal of knowledge, but
also a capacity to bring together ways of thinking that have
become institutionally separated; and any breaking-down of the
institutionally-erected (and patrolled) barriers between and within
disciplines will always threaten established interests and
practices. This challenge should now be taken up by departments
of literature, language, and linguistics, and by historians, as well
as by law schools.
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